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anticipatory breach, the court should have specifically held that an anti-
cipatory breach is an active breach which requires no putting in default and
that a suit for specific performance may be instituted immediately.
Michael D. Bewers
ALL IN THE FAMILY: EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IN
LOUISIANA SUCCESSION LAW
In Trimble v. GordonI the United States Supreme Court held that an
Illinois law prohibiting an illegitimate child from inheriting her father's
intestate succession, even though paternity had been judicially determined
prior to his death, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Succession of Robins2 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that Civil Code article 1488 was in violation of article I, section 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution 3 insofar as it denied the right of a father to dispose
of his separate property by testament to his own adulterous, illegitimate
children. An analysis of these two cases in light of Louisiana codal law
and its history suggests the necessity for significant alteration of
Louisiana's succession law.
Louisiana's Civil Code provides for different civil, social and politic-
al rights based on differences of conditions existing between persons.4
Children are either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated5 depending on
whether they are born in or out of marriage. 6 Illegitimates are further
classified as those conceived of parents who, at the time of conception,
might have legally contracted marriage and those whose parents could not
then have married 7 (adulterous' and incestuous 9 bastards). Adulterous
1. 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
2. 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
3. "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws .... No law
shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person be-
cause of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations
.... LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 24, as amended in 1921, now includes all differences
between persons. The original article referred only to differences based on sex. LA.
CIv. CODE art. 24 (1870) (as it appeared prior to the 1921 amendment).
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 178.
6. Id. arts. 179, 180.
7. Id. art. 181.
8. Id. art. 182.
9. Id. art. 183.
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children may be acknowledged by the subsequent marriage of the natural
parents but incestuous children may never be acknowledged. 0 Illegitimate
children who have been acknowledged by either parent are called natural
children," but acknowledgement does not give the illegitimate the same
succession rights as legitimates.'
2
These classifications become important upon examining the succes-
sion law, for they determine priorities of inheritance. 13 In all cases, if the
father or mother has legitimate children or descendants, an illegitimate has
no inheritance rights except to amounts needed for nourishment, lodging,
and support, called "alimony."' 4 Where there are no surviving legitimate
descendants the acknowledged natural child is ranked higher in the
mother's succession, inheriting ahead of ascendants, collaterals' 5 and the
surviving spouse,' 6 than in the father's succession where he is excluded by
all lawful relations and the surviving spouse and inherits only ahead of the
state.17 In no case may a bastard (adulterous or incestuous) inherit more
than mere alimony; 18 nor may a natural child inherit from the legitimate
relations of the parents.' 9
Legitimacy distinctions are also important to donations mortis causa.
If the parents leave legitimate offspring or descendants the law prohibits
such legacies to any illegitimate child except to the extent necessary for
sustenance or to procure an occupation or employment.2° If the parents
leave no legitimate descendants, the natural child may receive the
10. Id. art. 204. It is also reasonable to conclude that once the impediment to
the marriage of the natural parents has been removed, the adulterous child could
also be acknowledged by notarial act, for article 200 would allow legitimation in the
same manner and the greater right (legitimation) should include the lesser (acknowl-
edgement). See Goins v. Gates, 229 La. 740, 93 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. ,1957).
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 202. The jurisprudence has extended this definition to
children acknowledged by the mother. Briggs v. McLaughlin, 134 La. 133, 63 So.
851 (1914); Allen v. Anderson, 55 So. 2d 596 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
12. LA. Civ. CODE art. 206.
13. Id. art. 917.
14. Id. arts. 230, 918-20.
15. Id. art. 918.
16. Brooks v. House, 168 La. 542, 122 So. 2d 844 (1929); see Oppenheim, The
Fundamentals of Louisiana Succession Law, 23 TUL. L. REV. 305, 327 (1949).
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 919.
18. Id. art. 920.
19. Id. art. 921.
20. Id. arts. 1483, 1488. This allowance for sustenance, however, is not an
alimony and at least one case has allowed a sizeable legacy to an adulterous bastard
because it was not shown that the amount involved was more than necessary for his
sustenance. Succession of Haydel, 188 La. 646, 177 So. 695 (1937). For a discussion
of this case, see Note, I LA. L. REV. 631 (1939).
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mother's entire succession,2" but he may receive only a portion of the
father's,22 the rest going to the father's legitimate relations.23 In no case
may a bastard (adulterous or incestuous) receive more than what is neces-
sary for sustenance from either his father or mother.
24
The rationale behind these distinctions in the law may be better
understood by examining its historical framework. Louisiana succession
law is a mixture of Roman, Spanish, and French elements. 25 From the
Romans came the concept of the family as the central legal entity. Family
ties were all important, for the law emphasized the "family unit" and not
the individual.26 Protection of the family unit was therefore necessary for
legal reasons and not merely moral ones. Illegitimacy was important, not
because it reflected an immoral deviation from family oriented values, but
because it put the individual outside the family unit for jurisdictional
purposes under the Roman legal system. However, as the Spanish and
French codes were being formulated, protection of the family unit took on
a religious or moral basis, for the Roman concept of the family unit was no
longer applicable.27 The Digest of 1808 reflected the view that distinctions
such as those based on sex, legitimacy and minority were "natural distinc-
tions" and were permissible bases for discrimination in the law. 28 The
family unit concept, therefore, is deeply rooted in Louisiana's legitimacy
classifications even though the concept fulfills an entirely different pur-
pose than it did at Roman law in that it is aimed at the preservation of
family values. 2
9
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1484.
22. Id. art. 1486.
23. Id. art. 1487.
24. Id. art. 1488. See Succession of Haydel, 188 La. 646, 177 So. 695 (1937).
25. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 280, 283 (1932).
26. Tucker, Sources of Louisiana's Law of Persons: Blackstone, Domat, and
the French Codes, 44 TUL. L. REV. 264, 267 (1970).
27. Domat, when formulating a definition of legitimacy for his treatise, referred
to Deuteronomy: "Marriage being the only lawful way appointed for the propaga-
tion of mankind, it is but just to distinguish the condition of bastards from that of
children lawfully begotten. And it is because of this distinction that laws declare
bastards incapable of succeeding to persons who die intestate .... " J. Domat, I
CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 137 n.e (Cushing ed. Strauss trans. 1850). This
was not, however, the basis for legitimacy distinctions in Justinian's law. Domat
was ascribing canonical principles to justify its continued force. Tucker, supra note
26, at 270 n.29. Spanish law development was similar. See Pascal, Louisiana
Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate: Thoughts Prompted by Labine v.
Vincent, 46 TUL. L. REV. 167, 174-76 (1972).
28. This was Domat's view and is the basis for Civil Code article 24. Tucker,
supra note 26, at 282.
29. See generally Tucker, supra note 26.
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Determining the basis for Louisiana's legitimacy classifications is
important to consideration of the courts' application of equal protection
language in the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Although
federal jurisprudence is far from clear in its interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause, courts have generally recognized
that some disparate treatment of persons by the law is inevitable; there-
fore, they have often allowed states wide discretion in making reasonable
classifications based on distinctions such as sex, birth, and age to serve
necessary social and economic purposes. 30 However, any classification
must have some rational basis; that is, it must bear a reasonable relation to
the object of the statute (but not be the object of the statute itself),31 must
reflect a proper state purpose, 32 and must treat all persons within the class
similarly.
33
Louisiana did not have an equal protection clause in its constitution
until the 1974 revision, 34 but the language of the new constitution goes
further than that of the fourteenth amendment. Besides bestowing on all
persons a guarantee of equal protection of the laws, article I, section 3 also
states that no law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discrimi-
nate on the basis of birth, age or sex, among other characteristics.35 Thus,
30. E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (statute limiting working hours
for women held valid as in the public interest). One exception to this generalization
has been where the classification is termed "suspect." in such cases the classifica-
tion is put to "strict scrutiny" and the state must show a compelling state interest
which can be served only by the formulation of that particular classification, To
date only race and alienage have been classified as "suspect" classifications.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
31. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483 (1955); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
32. See cases cited in note 31, supra.
33. See cases cited in note 31, supra. A law is "over-inclusive" if it burdens or
benefits not only all those similarly situated but other persons as well. A law is
"under-inclusive" on the other hand, if it burdens or benefits only a portion of
those within the class. Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates, Inheritance, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REV. 377, 395 (1971); Tussman & ten-
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). See, e.g.,
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456
(1965).
34. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. See note 3, supra, for the text of this section.
35. Drafters at the Constitutional Convention intended the term "birth" to
apply to disabilities connected with legitimacy of birth in the law, although succes-
sions law is not mentioned specifically. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS, Aug. 29, 1973, at 62-63 [hereinafter
cited as VERBATIM TRANSCRIwTs]. The specific listing of types of discrimination was
[Vol. 38
NOTES
the article follows the federal courts' interpretation of equal protection
requirements in permitting reasonable discrimination based on natural
distinctions.36
In Levy v. Louisiana37 and Glona v. American Guarantee and
Liability Insurance Company3 8 the United States Supreme Court was
presented with the claim that Louisiana law, which had been interpreted to
forbid illegitimate children to recover for the wrongful death of their
natural mother, or the natural mother to recover for the wrongful death of
her illegitimate child, 39 violated the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court agreed that allowing only legitimates to recover for wrongful death
bore no rational relationship to the law's purpose, which was to provide a
remedy for persons injured by the wrongful death of a parent or child.
Levy and Glona were the opening wedge for a line of decisions by
the Supreme Court considering similar laws.' A Louisiana case, Labine
in response to the failure of the courts to apply the fourteenth amendment to these
particular classes. Id. at 58. See also Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1974).
36. See Hargrave, supra note 35, at 8. This has been the interpretation given in
the post-1974 decisions. E.g., Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976);
State v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975). The burden of proving "reasonableness"
rests with the state, and discriminatory laws are deprived of a presumption of
constitutionality. See Hargrave, supra note 35, at 8.
37. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
38. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
39. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315. See Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208
La. 83, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945); Sesostris Youchican v. Texas & P. Ry., 147 La. 1080,
86 So. 551 (1920).
40. Using similar reasoning, every Supreme Court decision prior to Trimble v.
Gordon, with two exceptions, invalidated legitimacy classifications in various state
and federal laws. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Beaty v. Weinberger,
478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974) (federal social security law
barred unacknowledged, illegitimate children born after a parent became disabled
from receiving benefits); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619
(1973) (New Jersey law denied indigent health care to illegitimate children of
otherwise qualified families); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.),
aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.),
aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972) (federal social security laws denied benefits to certain
classes of illegitimates); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(Louisiana workmen's compensation laws gave higher priority in death benefit
claims to the legitimate and acknowledged children of the decedent than to his
unacknowledged, adulterous children living within the same household). One im-
portant exception to this line of cases, and the only case concerned with classifica-
tions in successions law, was Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). The other
exception was Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), where the Court held that a
Social Security law which denied payments to illegitimate children unless they
could prove dependency on the parent, while not requiring such proof of legitimate
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v. Vincent,4 1 was an equal protection challenge to Civil Code article 919
by the acknowledged illegitimate son of the intestate deceased.42 The
father had legitimate collateral relations and the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the article granting them a preference. Levy was mentioned but
was considered limited to tort law. The Court applied an extremely
deferential analysis and merely held that the states had broad powers to
protect family life and to regulate dispositions of property within their
borders, and declined, in the absence of a clear constitutional guarantee, to
nullify any method chosen by elected representatives merely because it
disagreed with the state's reasoning or felt it could devise a better
method. 43 A strong dissent subjected the Louisiana statute to a more
exacting equal protection scrutiny to determine if its discriminatory effect
served valid state ends. 44 It came to the conclusion that the rationale
behind article 919 was merely a "moral prejudice of bygone centuries. ", 4
According to the dissent, the one factor which made the law constitution-
ally suspect was that it punished innocent children for the misdeeds of their
parents, which the dissent characterized as, in the very least, "unusual."46
State court decisions in the area are few, due probably to the estab-
lished nature of succession law and the fact that Louisiana had no equal
protection provision in its constitution until 1974. Labine v. Vincent was
an affirmation of Succession of Vincent,47 the first consideration of the
children, did not violate the fourteenth amendment. The Court found a valid state
purpose to be served in that legitimate children were more likely to be dependent
upon the parent than illegitimate children and the purpose of the law was to provide
aid to dependent children. The statute, instead of disqualifying all illegitimates
(which would make it over-inclusive), provided for the illegitimate child who could
prove dependency, thereby lessening its impact on the class of illegitimates as a
whole.
41. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
42. For an in-depth discussion of the equal protection ramifications of Labine,
see Petrillo, supra note 33. See also Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate,
65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967).
43. 401 U.S. at 538-39. But the Court did mention that the Louisiana law had a
rational basis in the promotion of family life and the orderly disposition of property.
Id. at 536 n.6.
44. Petrillo, supra note 33, at 399-405. The dissent considered and rejected the
following possible policies behind the Louisiana law: biological differences, precise
and orderly disposition of property by the state upon death, the presumed intent of
the decedent (i.e., how the average citizen would desire to dispose of his property
should he execute a will), and encouragement of marriage and discouragement of
illegitimacy. 401 U.S. at 551-56.
45. 401 U.S. at 541.
46. Id. at 557.
47. 229 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), writ denied, 255 La. 480, 231 So. 2d
395 (1970).
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matter of the constitutionality of legitimacy classifications by a Louisiana
court .4 In Succession of Captain 49 the deceased father (who had no
legitimate descendants) willed all of his property to his natural children.
The decedent's mother and collateral relations attacked the testament
under Civil Code article 1486 and the court reduced the children's legacy
to one-fourth of the decedent's property. Equal protection arguments were
rejected because the court maintained that the new constitution forbade
only unreasonable discrimination and that the statute had a reasonable
basis." The court applied the Labine philosophy that the nuances of
succession law promote unique state interests and thus should not be
tampered with by the courts.
Trimble v. Gordon was the first United States Supreme Court con-
sideration of legitimacy classifications in succession law since Labine.
The Court held unconstitutional an Illinois law which allowed an illegiti-
mate child to inherit by intestate succession only from the natural
mother.5 The child involved had been determined to be the daughter of
the deceased in a state court paternity action, and had been supported by
her father until his death. The probate court determined Gordon's heirs to
be only his parents, brothers, and sisters and the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed. 52 The United States Supreme Court discarded the Labine ap-
proach and instead undertook a thorough analysis to determine whether the
Illinois legitimacy classifications were rationally related to the statute's
underlying purposes. 3 After recognizing that the Illinois law did much to
48. The court here also discounted the relevancy of Levy and Glona and held
that legitimacy classifications have a reasonable basis in that the state validly
desired to encourage marriage, discourage illegitimacy, and ensure the stability of
land titles and the prompt determination of ownership of property upon death.
49. 341 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
50. The court was referring to stability of land titles, encouraging marriage, and
discouraging illegitimacy. 341 So. 2d at 1295.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1961). Section 12 has since been recodified
unchanged.-ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Supp. 1976).
52. In an oral opinion the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of its
decision in In re Estate of Karas, 61 111. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975), which had
relied on Labine.
53. The Court here stopped short of applying "the strict scrutiny" analysis
traditionally applied to "suspect classifications" (see note 30, supra) but also
rejected the extremely deferential approach used in Labine. "As we recognized in
Lucas, illegitimacy is analogous in many respects to the personal characteristics
that have been held to be suspect when used as the basis of statutory differentia-
tions . . . . We nevertheless concluded that the analogy was not sufficient to
require 'our most exacting scrutiny.' . . . Despite the conclusion that classifica-
tions based on illegitimacy fall in a 'realm of less than strictest scrutiny,' Lucas also
establishes that the scrutiny 'is not a toothless one ..... ' " 97 S. Ct. at 1463. The
1977]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
improve the illegitimate's position from the old common law rule of filius
nullius, 54 the Court considered the reasonableness of the justifications for
the remaining prejudices. 55
The first justification offered was the state's desire to promote legiti-
mate family relationships. The Court acknowledged that this is an accept-
able state aim, but reasoned that "the equal protection clause requires
more than the mere incantation of a proper state purpose." 56 Moreover,
the Court doubted whether the Illinois law was rationally related to the
accomplishment of that purpose. The Court pointed out the unjust and
illogical reasoning which would attempt to punish parents by imposing
sanctions on their children and reasoned that individuals were not likely to
shun illicit relations merely because children resulting from their union
would be unable to inherit from them. Thus legal burdens placed upon the
illegitimate child were declared "contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing." 57 Illinois also argued that the statute posed
no "insurmountable barrier'' 58 because the daughter could have inherited
his property if he had written a will to that effect. The Supreme Court
dismissed this contention by reasoning that the question of the constitu-
tionality of Illinois intestate succession laws should not depend upon the
occurrence or non-occurrence of a hypothetical situation. It was further
urged that the Illinois statute attempted to reflect the presumed intentions
of citizens who die intestate by disposing of their property according to
normal family affinities. The Court, however, found that the theory of
presumed intent was not one of the policies behind the enactment of the
Illinois law and therefore declined to consider this argument. 59
difference seemed to be that the Court refused to give to the Illinois succession laws
a presumption of constitutionality where illegitimates are disadvantaged, but in-
stead scrutinized the means selected to determine if they served the law's ostensible
purposes.
54. Under this doctrine, an illegitimate child was incapable of inheriting from
anyone. In re Ellis' Estate, 225 Iowa 1279, 1286, 282 N.W. 758, 762 (1938).
55. Trimble was decided on the basis of its effect on illegitimate children, and
did not reach the argument that the Illinois law discriminated on the basis of sex. In
addition, it had been argued in the Illinois courts that the law was racially dis-
criminatory because of its disproportionate impact on blacks. This argument was
not presented to the Supreme Court. 97 S. Ct. at 1463.
56. Id. at 1464.
57. !d. at 1465. The Court was quoting from the Weber decision, 406 U.S. at
175.
58. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 539.
59. The Court's refusal to hypothesize additional state purposes beyond those
articulated by the state itself in order to show the rationality of the classification is
[Vol. 38
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Of all the justifications advanced for the Illinois law's discriminatory
effect, the Court found most substantial the state's interest in regulating
the efficient and speedy disposition of property within the state. The state
claimed that proof of lineal relationship in the maternal line was fairly easy
to establish, but stressed the difficulties and possibilities of fraud when
dealing with proof of paternity. The Court admitted that such problems
might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming
under their father's estates, but found this justification not to apply in
Trimble, since Gordon had been declared to be the child's father in a
paternity action prior to his death. The rejection of this justification was
not done without substantial concern and consideration by the Court of
traditional state sovereignty in the succession law area.' In dictum the
Court stated that a statute would not offend equal protection requirements
if it did not broadly discriminate against illegitimates, "but [was] carefully
tuned to alternative considerations."- 61 For example, a state law could
perhaps reasonably bar illegitimates from inheriting from their natural
fathers if it also allowed for exceptions where paternity could be proven in
a precise and non-burdensome manner as would be the case for acknowl-
edged children or children whose paternity had been adjudicated. The
Illinois law, however, provided for no such consideration. The statute's
rational basis may have been permissible but the law was constitutionally
flawed because it failed to provide for instances where proof of paternity
would not be a problem in the orderly settlement of a succession. Thus the
law was over-inclusive62 because it encompassed all illegitimates, even
those whose paternal filiation could be ascertained without delaying or
burdening the succession procedure. The dissent would have upheld the
Illinois law attacked in Trimble on the basis that it was constitutionally
indistinguishable from the law upheld in Labine.63
another departure from the Labine approach. In any event, the opinion contained
words to the effect that such presumed intent would not meet fourteenth amend-
ment standards because, even if it is assumed that such laws correctly reflect the
individual's intent to disinherit his illegitimate child, the law is nevertheless an act
of the state rather than the individual, a distinction the Court called "fundamental."
97 S. Ct. at 1467 n.16. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
60. "The judicial task here is the difficult one of vindicating constitutional
rights without interfering unduly with the State's primary responsibility in this
area." 97 S. Ct. at 1465-66.
61. Id. at 1466. The Court was applying language from its recent decision in
Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 513. This is similar to the idea of "less restrictive
alternatives." See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
62. See note 33, supra.
63. 97 S. Ct. at 1468 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Rehnquist filed a
lengthy dissent in which he deprecated the majority for "endless tinkering with
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Soon after Trimble was decided, Succession of Robins was con-
sidered by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Robins involved the testamen-
tary disposition of property by a father to his sons who were adulterous
bastards. 6' The father, who had left no lawful relations, had willed all of
his separate property to the sons and acknowledged them in the same will.
Robins' surviving widow attacked the will under Civil Code article
1488,65 but the trial court held the article unconstitutional in light of the
equal protection provision of the 1974 Constitution, and its decision was
affirmed by the supreme court. 66
As the court so strongly emphasized in the opinion, the holding of
Robins is limited solely to the validity of article 1488,67 and the question
the court pondered was not whether illegitimate children may be treated
differently from legitimates, but whether the law may reasonably discrimi-
nate against adulterous bastards within the class of illegitimates. 6' The
court illustrated the unreasonableness of the distinction by pointing out the
absurdity of its effects. Only the fact that the sons were adulterously
conceived by the man who willed them his property prevented them from
receiving the legacy. Had the sons been merely illegitimate they could
legislative judgments," under the guise of interpreting the equal protection clause.
Justice Rehnquist maintained that the majority's scrutiny of the Illinois law's
purposes was actually a questioning of legislative motive, and that its analysis of the
methods chosen by the legislature to achieve these purposes was actually a value
judgment by the majority of what it thought the state ought to do with its succes-
sions law rather than what, constitutionally, it could or could not do. He would
return to the concept of extreme deference as applied in Labine and would not
interfere in the ordinary legislative process of the state on the basis of equal
protection unless the distinctions or classifications drawn by a law are "mindless or
patently irrational." 97 S. Ct. at 1468-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. See text at note 8, supra.
65. Both sons were fully capable of supporting themselves, so that the excep-
tion to article 1488 did not apply here. 349 So. 2d at 281.
66. See note 3, supra.
67. "Preliminarily, we emphasize that the present issue does not arise in the
context of passing upon the reasonableness of legislative classifications of legiti-
mate versus illegitimate children for purposes of intestate heirship, Articles 886-88,
902, 917-920, nor even for purposes of testamentary succession, Article 1483. Nor
does it arise in the context of the legislative reasonableness of the intestate succes-
sion of a surviving widow to her husbands's property in default of legitimate
descendants, to the exclusion of the husband's illegitimate children. Articles 917,
919." 349 So. 2d at 277.
68. "(The narrowed issue essentially involves the reasonableness of the legisla-
tive classification of adultery-conceived illegitimates as being incapable of receiving
testamentary dispositions from their parents, when such dispositions are not pro-
hibited as to other illegitimate children, nor as to (technically) ['legitimate'] children
likewise conceived as the result of an adultery.)" 349 So. 2d at 277. [Note: the word
in brackets appears as "legitimate" in the slip opinion, but as "illegitimate" in the
reporter. The former term seems to make more sense.]
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have received one-third of the father's property.69 If the sons had been
conceived in adultery by a person other than Robins, they could have
received by will the whole of Robins' property to the exclusion of the
surviving spouse. 70 The same would have been true if Robins had never
acknowledged them informally in his will. 7' Finally, and most absurd of
all, the court felt the sons would have been able to receive the entire legacy
had their mother been married to another man at the time she conceived
them. The law would have regarded them as legitimate sons of her
husband even though they were in fact conceived of an adulterous union.
72
Despite its primary reliance on the Louisiana Constitution, the court
employed language similar to that used by the United States Supreme
Court in its equal protection decisions.73 The Louisiana court stated that
the constitution requires laws to affect alike all those similarly situated in
the absence of a rational basis for the differentiation which was reasonably
related to a valid state purpose. 74 The only state purpose urged upon the
court was that of preserving the sanctity of marriage by penalizing adul-
tery, but the court quickly seized upon the language of the United States
Supreme Court in Trimble and pointed out the injustice and futility of
penalizing children for the misdeeds of their parents. 75 The majority could
find no rational state purpose served by article 1488, and held it to be in
clear violation of the 1974 Constitution because it discriminated on the
basis of birth. The dissenting justices argued that since article 1488 had
been part of the fabric of Louisiana law since the Digest of 1808 and had
been an integral part in the scheme of priorities in succession law, it was
unlikely that the new constitution had intended to obliterate it. The dissent
also maintained that the law served a valid state purpose by maintaining
"public moral standards,"-76 and should be given a presumption of con-
stitutionality. 77 The minority was especially troubled that this interpreta-
tion of the Louisiana Constitution would be the first of many decisions
69. Id. at 279-80. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1486.
70. 349 So. 2d at 279. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1496.
71. 349 So. 2d at 279. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 209; Succession of Cervini, 228
La. 1054, 84 So. 2d 818 (1956).
72. 349 So. 2d at 279. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 184-90.
73. See text at notes 30-33, supra.
74. 349 So. 2d at 278.
75. "[W]e have expressly considered and rejected the argument that a State
may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on
the children born of their illegitimate relationships." 97 S. Ct. at 1464-65, quoted at
349 So. 2d at 280.
76. 349 So. 2d at 285.
77. But see Hargrave, supra note 35.
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which would eventually place illegitimates on equal footing with legiti-
mate children in all areas of the law.
There are reasons to believe that this concern of the dissent is not
without substance. Although the holding of Robins is extremely narrow
and the factual setting could not have been better suited for such a holding,
there is language in the decision which could lead to a more expansive use
of article I, section 3 to affect other areas of succession law where
illegitimates are disabled or excluded. Furthermore, in Trimble the Su-
preme Court indicated that it would no longer employ the deferential
approach of Labine in considering discriminatory state succession laws,
but instead would make'a careful constitutional analysis of the law's
purpose and the means employed to effect that purpose.78 The result could
be a judicial and legislative restructuring of some facets of Louisiana
succession law at the state level.
The immediate, concrete 'effects of Trimble and Robins have actually
changed the law very little. Robins, of course, specifically invalidated
article 1488 only as it pertained to adulterous bastards,79 so that natural
parents may now donate mortis causa to their adulterous illegitimate
children the same part of their property they can leave to their natural
illegitimate children.8 0 Robins removed only one of the many legal bur-
78. "[W]e found in Labine a recognition that judicial deference is appropriate
when the challenged statute involves the "substantial state interest in providing for
the stability of . . .land titles and in the prompt and definitive determination of the
valid ownership of property left by the decedents. . . .We reaffirm that view, but
there is a point beyond which such deference cannot justify discrimination. Al-
though the proposition is self evident. . state statutes involving the disposition of
property at death are not immunized from equal protection scrutiny." 97 S. Ct. at
1464 n. 12. "[It is apparent that we have examined the Illinois statute more critically
than the Court examined the Louisiana statute in Labine. To the extent that our
analysis in this case differs from that in Labine the more recent analysis controls."
97 S. Ct. at 1468 n.17. See note 53, supra.
79. The question of what effect Robins may have on the rights of incestuous
bastards remains unanswered. It seems, however, that all of the arguments used by
the majority in Robins to demonstrate the unreasonableness of article 1488 as
applied to adulterous bastards apply equally well to the plight of incestuous chil-
dren. Given the proper factual setting the court may well do away with article
1488's burdens on incestuous bastards. It is not denied that the state may have a
legitimate interest in preventing incest, perhaps even more than in preventing
adultery, but both Robins and Trimble are unequivocal in stating that a law may not
attempt to affect the actions of the parents by imposing discriminatory burdens on
the children. In any event Louisiana already provides criminal sanctions for incest
imposed directly upon the participants, thereby adequately and more directly fulfil-
ling the state's interest in the area. See LA. R.S. 14:78 (1950).
80. See text at notes 20-22, supra.
[Vol. 38
NOTES
dens imposed upon illegitimates and did not touch upon the question of
whether illegitimates in general could be discriminated against by succes-
sion law. Trimble, on the other hand, was broader in its effect, but did not
deal with Louisiana law, and thus can not be said to have immediate
effects on our law. 8 The Illinois law at issue differed from the analogous
Louisiana provision because it barred any illegitimate from inheriting from
his father. Article 919 merely places the illegitimate on a lower rung of the
successions ladder, and provides for alimony so that the child is not
completely shut off from the estate.
However, the two decisions may have a significant impact on
Louisiana law by providing policies and guidelines for determining the
constitutionality of other provisions in succession law which are challeng-
ed in future litigation. Future cases in this area will very likely be decided
under the state constitution because of its equal protection provision which
specifically covers distinctions of birth. In that sense, the reasoning in
Robins will be significant. However, the interpretation given to the
fourteenth amendment in Trimble and its forerunners remains important
since the Louisiana equal protection provision was intended to be a
restatement of the federal provision but with greater specificity 82 It is
reasonable to assume that Louisiana courts would prefer to settle future
disputes in the area at the state level, with one eye on the Louisiana
Constitution and the other on the United States Supreme Court.
It thus appears certain that the courts will continue to apply the
rational basis test in an attempt to find a reasonable link between legitima-
cy classifications and the valid state purpose behind the law, while at the
same time determining whether the article is "carefully tuned to alterna-
tive considerations" 8 3 in satisfying that purpose. The purposes most often
put forth have been the stability of family life (to encourage marriage and
discourage illegitimacy), the speedy and accurate determination of title to
property upon death, and the "presumed intent" theory. The history of
81. Trimble did not expressly overrule Labine, and it did distinguish the
Louisiana law from the Illinois statute: "Louisiana laws at issue in Labine were
quite different. Those laws differentiated on the basis of the character of the child's
illegitimacy . . . . The Louisiana categories are consistent with a theory of social
opprobrium regarding the parents' relationships and with a measured, if misguided,
attempt to deter illegitimate relationships." 97 S. Ct. at 1464 n. 13. See also 97 S. Ct.
at 1468 n.17. Still the majority in Trimble considered Labine somewhat of an
anomaly. "Labine v. Vincent ... is difficult to place in the pattern of this Court's
equal protection decisions, and subsequent cases have limited its force as a prece-
dent." 97 S. Ct. at 1464 n.12. See also note 78, supra.
82. VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 35, at 64.
83. See note 61, supra.
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Louisiana law points strongly to the recognition of the family stability
policy as the principal motivating force behind the law of successions84
and the only possible explanation for Louisiana's unique treatment of
illegitimates in testate succession. These articles are an obvious attempt to
discourage illegitimate relationships by allowing parents to give property
to their legitimate children but not to the illegitimate ones. However, it is
not clear that preventing parents from willing property to their illegitimate
children achieves the desired results, and certainly a rising illegitimacy
rate would support an argument to the contrary. 85 In addition, it is
questionable whether Louisiana succession law would influence the aver-
age person's decision to have children outside of marriage, or even that the
average person would know of the legal effects of his decision upon future
children. So, in most cases, the law does not deter illegitimacy at all, and
works only to discriminate against the innocent illegitimate child. If the
discrimination no longer serves the purpose for which it was intended it
should be reconsidered. 86 Unless some other valid state end served by the
classifications in the testate succession law can be advanced, articles
1483-87 may well be declared unconstitutional along with 1488.87
Intestate successions, however, are a more difficult problem, because
different state purposes are involved. As was argued in Trimble, states
have a real interest in the quick and orderly disposition of property at
death. Disinheriting illegitimates serves this purpose since it obviates both
problems of lengthy litigation to ascertain filiation and the possibility of
fraud which would undoubtedly accompany the assimilation of illegiti-
mates into the intestate succession scheme. 8 Such an argument would
84. See text at notes 25-29, supra. This was also recognized by the Court in
Trimble, 97 S. Ct. at 1464 n.13.
85. In 1953 the total number of illegitimate births in Louisiana was 6,871 or 81.1
for every 1,000 live births. DIVISION OF PUBLIC HEALTH STATISTICS, LOUISIANA
STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC
HEALTH STATISTICS, 16 (1953). In 1%3 this number had increased to 8,666 illegiti-
mate births or 101.6 per 1,000 live births. DIVISION OF PUBLIC HEALTH STATISTICS,
LOUISIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE DIVISION
OF PUBLIC HEALTH STATISTICS, 22 (1%3). In 1973 illegitimate births in Louisiana
had risen to 12,285 total and 185.0 per 1,000 live births. OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
STATISTICS, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 1973
VITAL STATISTICS OF LOUISIANA, 25 (1973).
86. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1%1).
87. It may also be argued that Louisiana's laws protect the illegitimate child and
the natural parent from the "scandal" involved when the illegitimate child claims or
receives his inheritance. However, since such a child may still claim alimony under
article 920 or a subsistence legacy under article 1488, the likelihood of a "scandal"
is present to the same extent as the law now stands.
88. This is a possible explanation for the Louisiana laws which place a greater
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surely be advanced in asserting the constitutionality of Civil Code articles
917-920 which bar illegitimate children from inheriting when the parent
has legitimate descendants. However, as Trimble also mentioned, if the
state interest could be served adequately by alternative provisions which
would eliminate or lessen the impact of the discrimination, then those
provisions must be written into the law. 89
A possible solution to this problem in Louisiana would be to allow all
acknowledged illegitimate children and all children whose paternity has
been judicially determined, to enter the regular succession on an equal
basis with legitimate children.9 This would include rights to intestate
inheritance, donations, and forced heirship. Potential problems caused by
such a change, such as in stability of land titles, could be avoided by
adopting a modification which would allow the acknowledged illegitimate
to claim his inheritance or donation not as a fractional interest in, but
rather as a credit against, the succession, payable either in cash or by
partition of the decedent's assets and liabilities.9" The discretion would lie
entirely with the legitimate heirs (so long as the proportionate value is
given) and all movable and immovable property would remain under the
control of the legitimate heirs unless and until specific assets were trans-
ferred in satisfaction of an illegitimate child's claim.92 Such a proposal
would reduce the discriminatory effect of the intestacy laws by eliminating
the over-inclusiveness and lifting an unjust legal burden from most illegiti-
mate children. Although this scheme would not help the incestuous child
who could not, under article 204, be acknowledged, one could argue
based on Robins that no rational basis could be advanced for treating
incestuous children differently from other illegitimates in the acknowl-
edgement area. 93 Therefore, changes in the acknowledgement process
would be required in order to allow any illegitimate child to be acknowl-
burden on illegitimate children inheriting from the father than from the mother.
Proof of paternity is invariably more difficult and uncertain than proof of maternity.
See text at notes 15-17, supra.
89. See text at note 61, supra.
90. Acknowledgement could either be of a formal, statutory nature under Civil
Code article 203 or of an informal type. According to Professor Pascal, "Informal
acknowledgement results from any act of the parent expressing or implying par-
entage of the child, and decisions have given it the same effect as formal acknowl-
edgement for all purposes in favor of the child, but never in favor of the parent."
Pascal, supra note 27, at 169. See LA. CIv. CODE articles 208-12 for methods of
proving paternity.
91. This plan was earlier suggested by Professor Pascal. See Pascal, supra note
27, at 181-82.
92. See id.
93. See note 79, supra.
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edged by either parent without regard to type of illegitimacy or subsequent
legal marriage between the parents.
The constitutionality of Louisiana's intestacy laws is in serious doubt
unless some changes are made to allow them to survive a Trimble-type
analysis.94 Although the Court in Trimble did distinguish the Louisiana
law from the Illinois statute in certain respects such as the provision for
alimony, it left no doubt that it would use the new analysis if it considered
the Louisiana law.95 There is serious doubt that alimony provisions alone
would dissuade the Court from seeing an unreasonable discrimination in
Louisiana's succession law. Alimony cannot be considered an inheritance,
and does not even apply where the child is capable of supporting himself.
Furthermore, any assertion of the presumed intention rationale in Louisia-
na would likely meet the same fate as it did in Trimble, where the Court
said such a presumption, when given the force of law, amounts to nothing
more than state enforcement of private prejudices. 96
It is hoped that the necessary changes will come from the Louisiana
legislature. If, however, the present laws should be declared unconstitu-
tional in whole or in part by the courts it is respectfully suggested that the
new rule be applied prospectively only." This would avoid the disturb-
ance of settled property titles established in reliance upon the constitution-
ality of Louisiana's succession law. Whether it is the legislature or the
courts which finally settle the matter, it seems probable that Trimble and
Robins are the harbingers of substantial changes in some very basic and
deep-rooted Civil Law tenets.
P. Keith Daigle
94. An unsuccessful attempt was made to affect the law in this area in the 1977
regular session of the Louisiana Legislature. La. H.B. 122-29, 40th Reg. Sess.
(1977). These bills would have liberalized the restrictions on legitimates only in the
maternal succession, and thus would be similar to the Illinois law invalidated in
Trimble.
95. See note 78, supra.
96. See note 59, supra.
97. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court
have generally applied their rulings prospectively where vested contract or property
rights are concerned. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1975); Great
Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); Norton v.
Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 146, 150 So. 855, 858 (1933).
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